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KENTUCKY LAW JOjRNAL

FUTURE PROPERTY INTERESTS IN KENTUCKY*
IV.

PERSONAL PROPERTY

In considering the question of future interests in personal
property, Professor Gray quotes the statement from Lord Coke
in Lampet's Case, 1 where Coke says, "This case of a devise of
a lease for years to one for life, and after his death to another
during the residue of the term, hath produced septem questines
vexatits et spinosas." Professor Gray then adds, "The case of a
like bequest of a chattel personal has added to the difficulty of
these questions; they have never been satisfactorily solved, nor
does such solution seem possible until clear conception is formed
of the nature of future interests in personalty. This concep2
tion has hitherto been absent in the law."
In Kentucky it was early settled that there may be future
interests in personal property as well as in real. The question
came before the court in 1813 in the case of Keen and West v.
Macey.3 *Agift of slaves was made to one for life with remainder to her children, and the court held that the remainder was
lawful and effectual. Section 32 of a legislative act of 1798 in
respect to slaves provided "that no remainder of any slave or
slaves shall or may be limited by any deed or last will and testament in writing of any person whatsoever, otherwise than the
remainders of a chattel, personal, by the rules of common law,
can or may 'be limited."
As pointed out by the court, "the only question involved
in the determination of this cause, is whether by the rules of the
common law a chattel could be granted to one for life, with. a
limitation in remainder to another!" The court said, "It was
anciently held that chattels in their nature were incapable of
any limitation over, and that a grant or devise of them but for
an hour or a minute, was a gift forever. Hence it was a long
time before Courts of Justice could be prevailed upon to have
any regard for a devise over, even of a chattel real or term
for years, after an estate for life limited therein; and to get
*The first two parts of this article were published in Xi Kentucky Law Journal, p. 58 and p. 115.
110 Co. 46 b, 47 a.
2 Gray's Perpetuities (3rd Ed.) p. 587.
2 3 Bibb, 39.
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out of the literal authority of the old cases, a distinction was
formerly taken, that a remainder might be limited for the residue of the years, but not for the residue of the term, but by a
train of adjudged cases, that distinction does not now exist,
and the remainder of a term, or a personal chattel, may be
limited by will, whether the term, or the lease, or the use and
occupation of the land, or the lands themselves, or the use of the
chattel be bequeathed."
After reviewing the English cases the court further said:
"From these authorities, we think, by the rules of the common
law, as they are recognized and known, both in England and
this country, a personal chattel may be granted to one for life,
with remainder to another, either by will or deed."
The same principle was followed in several other early
cases. 4 The opinion in Betty v. Moore,5 however, raised the
question of whether such limitations can be created by conveyances inter vivos. The suit in that case concerned the validity of
a gift of a slave upon condition that if the donee die without
issue the chattel should revert. The court said the condition
was void and entire property vested absolutely in the first donee.
But the court admitted that the law was settled that there might
be a limitation of a remainder after a life estate in personalty.
Whatever doubt may have been raised by this decision as
to the creation of future interests in personal property by convayences inter vivous, seems to to have troubled the judges later.
In Johbnso's Adm'r v. Johnson" a conveyance of both realty
and personalty was made through a trustee to the grantor's wife
for and during her natural life, as her sole and separate estate
with remainder over to their children so far only as the real estate was concerned. The court in ruling that at the wife's death
the remainder in the personalty reverted to the husband observed:
"But we understand it to be well settled now that gifts for
and during the life of the donee or the life of another may be
made of personal property; and except when the nature of the
'Adie v. Cornwall, 3 T. B. Mon. 276.
Moore v. Howe, 4 T. B. Mon. 199.
BowZing v. Dobyns, 5 Dana, 434.
Jackson v. Sublett, 10 B. Mon. 467.
Knight v. Donahoo. 3 B. Mon. 277.
51 Dana, 235.
'104 Ky. 714.
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Property is such, as that it will be consumed in its use, the donee
shall have only the use for the specific term, and shall account
for the body of the gift to the person entitled thereto; when the
nature of the property is such as that its use means its consumption then the donee takes it absolutely."
The leading Kentucky case on the subject of future interests in personalty is, of course, McKee v. McKee's Executor.7
There the testatrix devised and bequeathed to her daughter A.
a dwelling house and "all the portraits and pictures, household
and kitchen furniture, table ware, china and silver ware, and
in other words, all the personal property used in and about said
house and premises . . . for and during her natural life,
and at her death to pass and go to her children or their decendants." There was also a life estate given another daughter S
in a fund of $5,000 subject to be defeated upon her remarrying and upon her death or remarriage it was to pass to a grandson. The court held that MItook a life interest in both the real
and personal property and that the remainder in each vested in
her children upon her death as provided in the will; and that S
took a life interest in the $5,000 subject to be defeated by her
remarriage. As to whether a life tenant of personal property
should be required to give a bond to protect the remainderman
the court decided that "where the life tenant is to have an income of money, or similar property devised, the possession of
which is directed to be given her, she may be compelled to execute a bond to the remainderman that it.will be forthcoming at
the termination of the particular estate. In the case of the personal property mentioned in the second item, the enjoyment of
which could not be had without its physical possession-probably without its consumption in whole or in part-the bond
should not be required, and was not in this ease."
The principles laid down in this decision seem desirable
and have been sustained by later cases.8 The most recent cases
on the subject are those of Laneiscus v. The Louisville Trust
Company, Ez'or and Bartlett v. Same, 9 in which cases a life interest was given the husband of the testatrix with all the powers
7 26 Ky. L. Rep., 736, 82 S. W. 451.
"Harris,et al.v. New, et al., 167 Ky. 262, 180 S. W. 375.
Kelly v. Anderson, et aL, 173 Ky. 298, 190 S. W. 1101.
p201 Ky. 222.
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and authority over the property of an absolute owner, except
that he could not make a testamentary disposition of any part
of it. It was contended on the part of the husband that "at
common law the only characteristics of absolute ownership in
personal property were the right of possession and the right of
absolute disposition, and that when they are combined the entire estate in the property is vested in the one having those
rights.". The court rejected this view and held that the testatrix
could create a life estate in the first taker, with power of disposition by him, and also create a future interest in the remainder of it not so disposed of.
To meet the argument that the attempted limitation of the
"remainder" interest in the husband's share was void because
under the terms of the will he took all of it and there was nothing
left to which the attempted "remainder" interest could attach
the court said: "Necessarily that argument must and does proceed upon the theory that the word 'remainder' has the same
significance when applied to the creation of future interests in
personalty that it has in the creation of the same character of inerests in realty. If the premise is correct the conclusion contended for would necessarily follow, but we are not prepared to
admit the similitude. If the devised personalty is given in
specie and is non-perishable, nor will be fully consumed in its
use by the life tenant, there may be a 'remainder' interest
created in it similar to that in real property; but, if the property is of a perishable nature and if the use of it by the life
tenant destroys or consumes it the word 'remainder,' as applied
to a future interest, has no such significance as when applied
to the same interest in realty. When applied to realty the word
designates a future title to the whole of the property, while if
applied to the aggregate of personalty, perishable or non-perishable, it can at most refer and attach to the residue or remnant of the property."
V. CONsTRucTION OF LIMITATIONS

When we come to the construction of limitations we are
dealing with a subject where the courts' decisions may appear
to differ upon facts that seem to be the same. This result is due
to the fact that in construing wills, the court looks first to see
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what is the intent of the testator from the language he has employed,'0 and in so doing it will look to the entire will and not
confine its investigation to the language of a particular sentence,
clause or paragraph."
The words and phrases most often passed upon by the court
in connection with limitations on future estates are "heirs" or
"heirs of a living person," "survivor" or "survivors," "dying
without children" or "without issue surviving;" words purporting gifts on failure of issue, cross-limitations or remainders; the
determination of classes; and divesting contingencies and conditions precedent to the taking effect of executory devises and
bequests.
The Meaning of Heirs or the Heirs of a Living Person..

(a)

The general rule as laid down in Tiffany in the case of a
limitation in favor of the testator's heirs is that the word
"heirs" means primarily those persons who were the heirs at
the time the testator died and not those who are his heirs at the
time the heirs acquire possession.' 2 The word may also be used
to designate those who are heirs "apparent" at the time of the
execution of the will, those who would be heirs were the testator
to die at that time.'3 "The word 'heir,' in its strict technical
sense, denotes the person on whom at the ancestor's decease, the
law casts the inheritance."14
In passing upon the will of Henry Clay the Kentucky court
ruled that the term "heir" in a will should be interpreted according to the subject matter, when there is no other clue to its
interpretation. If the subject be realty, the term should be understood in its technical sense, and if the subject be personalty,
the same term should be held as importing distributees or successors. 15 The case of Prather v. Watkins'- Executor'6 laid
down the general rule that where there is a devise or bequest to
"heirs," "heirs at law," or "legal heirs," the law presumes the
intention of the testator to be that the beneficiaries so designated
Reed v. Williams, 194 Ky. 662.
Protherv. Watson's Ex'or, 187 Ky. 709.

Martin v. Thompson, Ex'r, 191 Ky. 102.

Tiffany, Real Property, sec. 497.

Williamson v. Williamson, 18 B. Mon. 329.

14

Williamson v. Williamson, 18 B. Mon. 368.

15Clay v. Clay, 2 Duv. 295.
187 Ky. 709, 220 S. W. 532.
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shall take per stirpes and not per capita but that a contrary intent may be shown.
In considering whether a testator intended to use the word
"children" in the sense of "heirs," the court in Naville v.
American Machine Company 17 reviewed the cases on the subject
and divided them into three classes: First, where there is a devise by a father or mother to a son, daughter, or blood relation,
in which the language "to him and his children forever" is
used, the word "children" has been construed as meaning
"heirs," and they take no interest in the property devised.
Second: In devises to a blood relation and his children,
where the word "forever" is not used following the word
"children," the children take a fee subject to the life estate of
the parent; and
Third: In devises by a husband to his wife and her children,
the children take the fee and the parent the life estate. In the
particular case under consideration by the court there was a devise to "my beloved daughter, Anna Marie Naville for her to
enjoy for herself and her children forever." The court held
that case came within the first class and the daughter took a fee
simple; the word "children" was used as a word of inheritance
and not of purchase.
In Hayes, et al. v. Hayes, et al.,' 8 there was a devise to testator's daughter Alice, "or her heirs," Pauline, John, Elva,
Richard, William and Margaret. The court after construing
"'or" to mean "and" held that the case fell within the second
class enumerated in Naville v. American Machine Company, and
that the daughter took a life estate, with the remainder to her
six children in fee.
In Froman, et al., v. Froman, et al.,19 the court was called
upon to determine the meaning of a crudely worded will where
a daughter was to have real estate for her lifetime "for her
benefit if she has no heir of her own ishue at her death to come
back to my bodly heirs," and the court held the daughter took a
life estate with a remainder in her children living at her death.
Walden v. Smith, et a., 20 involved the construction of a
deed which gave an interest to a daughter for life with remainder
-, 145 Ky. 349.

154 Ky. 729.
-175 Ky. 536.
179 Ky. 829.
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at her death to her "heirs" and the court concluded from the
wording of the whole instrument that "heirs" was used in the
sense of "children" and was intended as a word of purchase and
not of limitation.
An opposite result was reached in the recent case of jons,
Gdn., et al., v. Lyons, Ex'r, et at., 2 1 where a deed conveyed a
joint estate to a husband and wife for and during their lives with
remainder to the "heirs of their bodies." The court said: "The
words 'heirs of their bodies' must be held to-mean in effect the
same as 'heirs of his body,' and 'heirs of her body,' hence joint
heirs are included in the expression. There is nothing in the
deed to indicate that the expression 'heirs of their bodies' was
intended to be used as synonymous with or equivalent to 'children' or 'their children.' We must, therefore, give to the expression 'heirs of their bodies' the usual technical meaning
which that expression generally imparts, which is that of joint
descendants of the two living at the time of the death of the survivor of the life tenants."
These cases show the trend of the decisions where the court
has been called upon to interpret the word "heirs" or similar
expressions.
(b)

"Survivor" Construed as "Other."
Courts as a general rule have construed "survivor," "surviving" or their equivalents as "other" where to do so will let
in issue of predeceased members of a class and carry out the
probable intent of a testator.. This is especially true where any
other construction would lead to an intestacy or to inequality
among those standing in the same degree of relationship, to the
testator. The Kentucky court, however, and a few other courts
have taken the position that this is a forced construction, and
that the burden of proof in such a case is on the party maintaining that this is the proper construction in a particular
22
case.
The court states the problem clearly in Gorham v. Betts :23
"There has been much discussion as to the effect of provisions
in wills in favor of 'survivors.' The controversy has been
- 201 Ky. 520.
37 Cyc. 640.
86 Ky. 164, 5 S. W. 465.

2
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whether the word should have its literal and natural meaning,
or whether it should prima facie be construed as equivalent to
the word 'others' in the absence of circumstances or something
in the context showing that it was used in a strictly literal
sense. "
In Harris v. Berry2 ' the court considered the word "survivor," as used in the will before it, a flexible term which
might be molded by the context and spirit of the will to comprehend all the testator's surviving descendants who were intended to be beneficiaries. The view of the court is more clearly
stated in Bayliss v. Prescott,2 5 that "the proper intention of the
testator can not be reached by departing from the language of
the will, which must be constrhed and not changed. In the
absence of all explanation by the rest of the instrument, the
word survive, as used in Bayliss' will, must be interpreted according to its literal and plain meaning, this being the rule established by a number of cases."
2
Cases of a similar nature are McCormick v. Reinberger, 6
and Moore's Adm'r v. Sleet,2 7 where the court substituted the
word "and" for "or" in order to carry out the intention of the
testators.
(c)

Vesting of Legacies.

Whether the testator intended a legacy to take effect as an
immediate gift altho its enjoyment be postponed or whether it
be intended a gift conditioned upon some future event, as attaining a certain age or marrying, often presents difficult questions in the construction of the language used in a will. Where
there is a gift of a legacy to V person at, if or when he shall attain, or upon his attaining, twenty-one or marrying, courts have
held that the gift does not vest until the legatee becomes twentyone or marries whatever the condition may be. The court in
Roberts' Executors v. Brinker2 s dealt with this question. To
quote from the opinion at length:
"Bequests of personalty are construed generally according
to the rules of the civil laws; and according to the doctrines of
2'7 Bush, 113.
279 Ky. 252.
"1194 Ky. 603.
7113 Ky. 600, 68 S. W. 643.

"5 Dana, 570.
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that code, adopted in Courts of Equity, which take cognizance
of legacies, a legacy given when the legatee marry or attain
a prescribed age, without anything else in the will, controlling
or aiding the interpretation of it, will be understood to be contingent, and 'when' will, in such a case, be deemed synonymous
with if, or some other word or phrase implying a condition precedent to the vestiture of any certain interest. And accordingly, a bequest of money to an infant at twenty-one years of age,
or when he shall become twenty-one years old, will be construed
to mean that he shall have no interest unless he shall attain the
prescribed age. But a legacy to an infant in preseinti,to be paid
in futurc is deemed to be vested, and as not depending on his
living until the time fixed for payment."
In Wallivgford v. DeBe1129 the court pointed out the fact
that there is a distinction between the cases in which the time
or event mentioned in the bequest qualifies the gift itself and
those in which it is to be taken as referring to the time of payment. The court said that if the qualification is annexed, not to
the gift or legacy itself, but merely to the time of payment, although the enjoyment be postponed, the right vests immediately.
So where a testator devised slaves to his grandchildren and directed his executor to hire them out until the youngest became
twenty-one years of age and then sell them and divide the proceeds equally; it was held in Hocker v. Gentry30 that the grandchildren took vested interests at the time of the testator's death.
*Wherever the postponement of the payment of a legacy is
31
for the convenience of the estate the legacy vests at once
In W 'lett's Adm'r v. Butter's Adrn'r,3 2 the will provided
that surplus personal property should be converted into money
and loaned out during the life of testator's wife and at her
death divided between his daughter and granddaughter. As
testator had made other provision for their maintenance and
there was nothing to show an intent that they should enjoy the
interest in the meantime, the court ruled that the daugher and
granddaughter took only a contingent interest in both principal
and interest. However, in Evans v. Henderso;03 the court held
15 B. Mon. 551.
3 Metc. 463.

Kamp's Ex'r v. Hallanberg,8 Ky. L. R. 529.
84 Ky. 317, 1 S. W. 640.
- 24 Ky. L. R. 363, 68 S. W. 640.
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that the children took a vested remainder where testator devised
his realty and personalty to his wife for life and provided that
after the payment of her funeral expenses, "then" the remaining property should go to his "loving children, all to share
alike," and the child of one who died before the widow did,
took his parent's share. The first of these cases seems to be contrary to the general rule that the law favors holding a remainder
or legacy as vested, unless there is a clear intention that it shall
not vest immediately. Where the payment of the principal is
postponed, a gift of the interest in the meantime tends to show
an intent to make an immediate gift of the principal.
(d)

Gifts Over Upo= Death Without Issue.

In marked contrast to the small number of cases in the
Kentucky reports bearing upon the question of when a bequest
of personalty vests is the very great number of decisions dealing with gifts over upon a prior taker's "dying without issue"
or "dying without children." "Dying without issue" may refer to death before that of the testator, to death during the lifetime of a life tenant, or to death at any time, that is, an indefinite failure of issue.
Since estates tail no longer exist in Kentucky the latter construction would be bad in this State because it would bring the
devise within the prohibition of the rule against perpetuities.
The court early rejected the old English rule in favor of construing such phrases as importing an indefinite failure of issue3"
and we find section 2344 of our statutes providing that "unless
a different purpose be plainly expressed in the instrument,
every limitation in deed or will contingent upon a person dying
'without heirs,' or other words of like import, shall be construed a limitation to take effect when such person shall die,
unless the object on which the contingency is made to depend
is then living, or, if a child of his body, such child be born
within ten months next thereafter." This abolished the common law rule as to an indefinite failure of issue.
4Dan iel v. Thomson, 14 B. Mon. 562.
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In Harvey v. Bell 35 the court reviewed its earlier holdings
on the interpretation of such phrases as "dying without issue"
and laid down four rules:
1. "Where an estate is devised to one for life, with remainder to another, and, if the remainderman die without
children or issue, then to a third person, the rule is that the
words 'dying without children or issue' are restricted to the
death of the remainderman before the termination of the particular estate. '36
2. "On the same principle, where property is devised to
one or more infants, and is to be held by their trustees or
guardians until they are twenty-one years old, and then to be
turned over to them, or divided between them, with the proviso
that, if they die without issue, it shall go to the survivors, or, if
all die, to a third person, it has been held that the limitation as
to dying without issue is to be limited to a death in infancy before the period of distribution.31
3. "And where, by the will, the devise is to
the period of division is postponed even where the
not infants, it has been held that the limitation
without issue must be confined to a death without
' 38
the period of division fixed by the will."

a class, and
devisees are
as to dying
issue before

4. "On the other hand, where there is no intervening estate, and no other period to which the words 'dying without
issue' can be reasonably referred, they are held, in the absence
of something in the will evidencing a contrary intent, to create
a defeasible fee which is defeated by the death of the devisee
3118 Ky., 512, 81 S. W. 671.
Citing Pool v. Benning, 48 Ky. 623.
Mercantile Bank v. Ballard, 88 Ky. 481.
Ferguson v. Thomason, 87 Ky. 519.
Dickison v. Ogden, 89 Ky. 162.
Pruitt v. Holland, 92 Ky. 641.
Lewis v. Shropshire, 68 S. W. 426, 24 Ky. L. R. 331.
Baxter v. Isaacs, 71 S. W. 907, 34 Ky. L. R. 1618.
"Citing Hughes v. Hughes, 51 Ky. 115.
Thackston v. Watson, 84 Ky. 206.
Trabue v. Terry, 9 S. W. 161, 10 Ky. L. R. 345.
Wilson v. Bryan, 90 Ky. 482.
Jones v. Mdore, 96 Ky. 273.
Kephart v. Hieatt, 78 S. W. 425, 25 Ky. L. R. 1602.
I Citing Duncan v. Kennedy, 72 Ky. 580.
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at any time without issue then living.'' 39 The court recognizes
the fact that all these rules must yield to the intent of the testator as shown by the whole will.
This eorrelaion does not provide for eases like Burnham v.
Suttle,40 Powell's Ex'r v. Crosby et al.,4 1 and Rue v. Lisle 42
where the court held that "dying without issue" meant death
during the lifetime of the testator. However, the rules laid
down are often cited in later decisions. Among those standing
for the proposition of the first rule that where an estate is devised to one for life, with remainder to another, with gift over
on the remainderman's dying without issue, the words "dying
without issue" are restricted to death before the termination of
the particular estate may be noted Bradshaw v. Williams, 43 Wilson v. Wilson, 44 Baker v. Thomas, 45 Spacey v. Close,4 6 Eakins
v. Eakins,47 and Banner v. Wedekins.48 And among the many
supporting the fourth proposition that where there is no intervening estate, or where there is a period fixed for distribution,
the words create a defeasible fee, defeated by death at any time
without issue are Johnson et al v. Powell et al,5 ° Craig'sAdvm'r
v. Williams,6 ' and Bacon v. Dickinson.5 2 A very recent case
coming within the third rule that "dying without issue" in an
instrument devising property to a class, refers to death without
issue before the time fixed for division, is the ease of Linton,
Guardianv. Hail.53
: Referrlng to Hart v. Thompson, 42 Ky. 482.
Deboe v. Lawen, 8 B. Mlon. 616.
Daneil v. Thomson, 53 Ky. 662.
Harrisv. Berry, 70 Ky. 113.
Sale v. Crutchfield, 71 Ky. 636.
Crozier v. Crundall,99 Ky. 202 and others.
148 Ky. 495.
"89 S. W. 721, 28 Ky. L. R. 619.
"200 Ky. 520.
140 Ky. 160.
151 Ky. 790.
"172 Ky. 334.
" 184 Ky. 523.
47191 Ky. 61.
43193 Ky. 743.
4200 Ky. 202.
160 Ky. 591.
"179 Ky. 329.
1199 Ky. 121.
1201 Ky. 591.
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(e)

Cross Remainders by Implication.
The second rule in Harvey v. Bell concerned express cross
remainders and settled the time referred to by such expressions
as "dying without issue." Another important question relative
to cross remainders is when, if ever, they are to be implied.
In its opinion in Eckridge v. Deweese 54 the court quotes in
full the definition of a cross remainder as given by Bouvier:
"Where a particular estate is conveyed to several persons in
common, or various parcels of the same land are conveyed to
several persons in severalty, and upon the termination of the
interest of either of them his share is to remain over to the rest,
the remainders so limited over are said to be cross remainders.
In deeds such remainders can not arise without express limitation. In wills, they frequently arise by implication." In the
case before the court, it was conceded that the will contained
no express provision creating a cross remainder but it was contended that one arose by implication. In the particular will,
however, the court failed to find that one was created by implication.
In Bahou v. Bohon55 the Court of Appeals states the general rule that cross remainders can be given by deed only by
express limitations and can never be implied, while in wills a
more liberal construction is given and they may be raised by
implication. Otherwise in the case of wills a partial intestacy
might occur. In raising cross remainders by implication the
court is thereby seeking to carry out the probable intention of
the testator. As pointed out by Tiffany5 Gthere is one difference
to be kept in mind between cross remainders and cross executory limitations-in the latter, after the limitation of estates
in fee- simple to two or more persons, it is provided that, in
certain events, the share of each shall pass to the other or others
-and that distinction lies in the fact that, even in wills, cross
executory limitations are not implied, in so far at least as their
existence would involve the divesting of an estate previously
vested. In such a case no implication is necessary to avoid intestacy.
180 Ky. 488.
"

78 Ky. 408.
Real Property (2nd Ed.) 582.
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(f)

Determinationof Classes.

Another type of cases where the court is called upon to
construe terms used in a will, is where property is given to a
group or class of persons. It becomes necessary to decide at
what time the class is determined in order to settle the question as to whom the class includes. Where there is a devise to
a body of persons uncertain in number at the time of the execution of the will and to be ascertained at a future time is a devise to them as a class and not as individuals. 5t The time of
settling the members of the class may be that of the death of
testator, the death of the life tenant or the time of distribution,
as where it is to be made upon the eldest child's attaining twentyone years of age or marrying.
Where an immediate gift is intended to the children of a
living or deceased person, if any are alive at the testator's death,
they alone are entitled to take; but if no children are living at
the time of testator's decease, all children subsequently coming
into existence are entitle to take. The general rule, however,
has not been followed in Kentucky, as pointed out by the
court in Baker v. Baker, Jr.- 5s "At common iaw a bequest to
a class was held to embrace all in the class at the time the bequest was to take effect, but where there was a postponement
of the payment of the legacy until a period subsequent to the
death of the testator every person answering the description at
the time fixed for the division was held entitled to participate
as one of the class. This is the rule that has been adopted in
many states.
"In this State, however, the common law rule has not
been followed, and in the cases of Lynn v. Hall, 101 Ky., 738;
Goodridge v. Schaoefer, 24 Rep., 219; Claywood, et al. v. Jones,
et at., 108 S. W. 888; Gray's Adm'r v. Pash, et at., 24 Rep., 963;
and U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Douglas' Trustee, 120 S.
W., 328, it is held that a bequest to the children of A would, in
the absence of a contrary intent expressed in the will, include,
not only the children of A living at the death of the testator,
but all such as might thereafter be born to him. It may be said
that this rule of construction is now well settled law of this
',Milton v. ellors, 167 Ky. 704, 181 S. W. 346.
Rogers v. Burress, 199 Ky. 769.
-143 Ky. 66.
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State; and in the absefice of some expression in the will indicating a contrary intention on the part of the testatrix, the
principle would govern in the case at bar."
The court decided, however, that the direction in the particular will that the property should be divided among the
children, share and share alike, showed an intention on the part
of the testatrix that only those living at her death should participate.
In U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Company v. Douglas'
Trustee5 9 the court said that the word "grandchildren" means
not only the offspring of children in being at the time of testator's death but any that may be thereafter born. It further
said, "This is the only just, reasonable, and fair rule of construction. A child of a son or daughter is no less a grandchild
because born after the death of its grandparent, and common
justice would require that afterborn children should be entitled
to participate in the residuum of the estate unless there is some
provision in the will evincing clearly an intention on the part
of the testator that they should not be permitted to do so."
Then we have the case where a division is not to be made
among the members of a class until the death of a life tenant or
until the oldest member of a class reaches a certain age. It is
generally held that the property vests immediately in those living at the testator's death subject to divesting in part to let in
any afterborn children; that is, while none that are in the class
at the time the will becomes effective, drops out, new members
may be added before the time of distribution. The court so
held in May v. Walter's Executors,60 Walters v. Crittcher,61
02
Turner v. Patterson,
and Phillips v. Johnson. 3
In Groan v. Maraman'g Guardianc4 there was a devise to a
wife and son, providing that if both should die before the son
became twenty-one years of age, the property should go to testator's surviving partners. There were two partners at the
time of testator's death and it was held each took an interest
134 Ky. 374.
97 S. W. 423, 30 Ky. L. R. 59.
15 B. Mon. 2.

5 Dana, 292.
14 B. Mon. 140.
148 Ky. 135.
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which was not defeated by the death of one before the death of
the son.
Another case of passing interest in connection with this
subject is that of Dokn s Executor v. Dohn and others.6 5 Testator bequeathed one hundred dollars a month to his wife for life,
and seventy-five dollars a month to each child until the youngest
should reach twenty-one years. On death of the wife and on the
youngest child's reaching twenty-one, the entire estate was to be
divided among the children or their heirs. The will provided
further that "the issue of the child or children dying should
"110 Ky. 884, 62 S. W. 1033.

The monthly installments
inherit the share of its parent."
were held to be absolute gifts but a distributive share of the
estate did not vest until the youngest became twenty-one or the
death of the widow occurred, whichever event should happen
last.
(g)

Divesting contingencies and conditions precedent to taking
effect of executory devises and bequests.

The last questions to be considered under construction of
wills are, what effect the failure of a gift over will have upon
the preceding interest and what effect will the failure of the
preceding interest have upon an executory devise or bequest?
As an instance of the former case, suppose a testator leaves his
property to his daughter A, when she shall attain twenty-one,
with a gift over to his nephew in the event of her death without
leaving issue; and that the nephew dies before the testator. Does
the daughter take an absolute interest ? The New Jersey court
held that shoe would. 66 Runyon, Ch., said: "The gift to Jane
was absolute, subject to be defeated by the contingent executory
gift over. She was the primary object of his bounty. The
provision made in the contingency of her dying without leaving
lawful issue, was made expressly for another object of his
bounty whom he desired and intended to benefit in that event.
That object had ceased to exist, and the provision, therefore,
was at an end, and the primary gift was left wholly unaffected
by it." This view would seem to carry out the intention of the
testator and is in accord with the American decisions but contra
to the English cases on the point. 67
6Drummond v. Drummond, 11 C. E., Green (N. J.) 234.
"Tiffany, 1 Real Property, p. 587.
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The rule is very clearly stated in the first edition of the
American and English Encyclopaedia of Law: 68 "The better
opinion is that where an executory interest is limited after a
fee simple in realty or an absolute interest in personalty, the
prior interest becomes indefeasible, on the failure of the ulterior
interest, since the prior interest is only to be defeated for the
benefit of the ulterior interest, and that purpose failing the original interest remains. Hence on principle it would seem immaterial whether the ulterior interest failed because the contingency upon which it was limited to take effect had not happened,
or had become impossible, or because the ulterior limitation itself
was void in its creation, or had lapsed by the death of the executory devisee in the lifetime of the testator."
A Kentucky decision cited to support this rule is that of
Gorham v. Betts.69 The testator provided in his will that certain realty should go to his daughters and "in case either of my
daughters above named should die, leaving no child living at her
death, then her portion shall be equally divided between her
sisters only, my sons taking no part thereof." The court held
that this created a defeasible fee in the daughters only so long
as there was a survivor of the class named and that when but
one remained alive there could be no defeasance, although she
might die childless. Therefore it was evident the testator intended to vest a fee simple in her.
Now, suppose we have a devise to a child or the children
of A, but if all such children die under twenty-one, then to 13,
and A dies without having had children, does the estate vest in
B? It is generally held that it does as such a result is what
the testator intended. The Kentucky decision nearest in facts
seems to be Armstrong v. Armstrong79 where testator having
three children by his first wife and four by his second, in making provision in his will for the children of both marriages,
directed that "in the event of any of said children departing
this life without issue, or such issue dying themselves, then that
portion so willed to each person so departing this life shall descend to the full brother or sisters who may survive, to be divided as nearly equal among them as may be; and in the event
"Vol. 20, p. 942.
6986 Ky. 164.
14 B. Mon. 269.
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of them all departing this life, then the whole estate, real and
personal, is to be divided among my first wife's children." One
of the children, of the last marriage died an infant, before the
testator, and the court held that the portion of such child did
not lapse but vested in the full brothers and sisters who survived.
As a last word relative -to construction of wills one can not
do better than to bear in mind always the words of the court
in Reed v. Williams71 that "the rule of construction to which
all others must give way is that the intention of the testator
must be ascertained from the instrument as a whole and in the
light of the circumstances and conditions surrounding him at
the time of its execution."
(To be continued)
W. LEwIS ROBERTS
University of Kentucky
College of Law
- 194 Ky. 662.

